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Introduction1
Energy policy is usefully characterized by the degree to which resource nationalism2 (RN) and
energy security 3 (ES) are pursued. The balance achieved between these two key concepts
dramatically affects global energy supplies. Over the past century, both of these ideas have
played particularly significant roles in Latin America, where the oil industry first developed
outside the United States, and an area that continues to draw the attention of the world market.
Because Latin America is a growing source of hydrocarbons4 for the world market, its energy
policies are of increasing importance. The United States is particularly affected by Latin
American oil policies, as 43 percent of U.S. imports from January to August 2009 came from the
region; five of the top 15 source countries were Mexico (#2), Venezuela (#3), Brazil (#8),
Colombia (#10), and Ecuador (#12).5 Although the United States imports very little oil from
Argentina, that country exports more oil than Ecuador, a member of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In addition to traditional investment from the United
States and Europe, Latin America now attracts investment from Chinese, Indian, Russian, and
Iranian national oil companies (NOCs).
Whether Latin America will continue to export expected volumes of oil and gas, however, is an
open question. Oil exports from Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina are down, as are
natural gas imports from Bolivia. Geology has something to do with the decline, but so do the
levels of resource nationalism and energy security philosophies that can be found in these
countries’ energy policies. Resource nationalism and energy security policies are not inherently
at odds with each other, but finding the balance between them means considering domestic and
1

I thank Amy Myers Jaffe for her helpful comments. Responsibility for views herein is mine alone.
The core idea behind a resource nationalism perspective is that the natural resources in the ground or under the sea
are a “national patrimony” and consequently should be used for the benefit of the nation rather than for private gain.
In addition, the commodity itself has an intrinsic value, not one determined by the market, and this value belongs to
the nation.
3
Energy security embodies a claim for government action to protect national economic activity from, or
significantly mitigate the impact of, shocks emanating from the international market.
4
90 percent of known lithium deposits are in four Latin American countries: Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil.
Thus efforts to diminish the world’s reliance on hydrocarbons by significantly expanding our use of electrovoltaic
power will further increase the importance of Latin America.
5
Energy Information Administration, Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries, January-August
2009.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html
accessed October 31, 2009.
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international interests in these hydrocarbons. If resource nationalism and energy security
concepts guide national policy, long-term global oil supplies will be maximized when producing
countries use their oil rents to generate public goods, such as a minimum level of health,
education, and public security, as well as a competent and honest public bureaucracy.
Alternatively, if the rents are used mainly for private goods (e.g., employment and government
contracts for the politically connected; a transportation infrastructure to serve middle class needs,
etc.) energy policy will be unstable and supplies to the global market will suffer.
How did we reach today’s balance between RN and ES in the region? At the start of the 1980s,
governments controlled the energy sector in all of the major Latin American countries— even in
the case of the archetypal neoliberal military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina—and they
favored resource nationalism policies vis-à-vis international markets and energy security
orientation at home. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, low international oil prices, a lack of state
capital to support NOC exploration and production (E&P), as well as increasing concerns over
the environmental consequences of an electric power system based on oil and hydro, forced
energy policy reforms in every country in the region. As democracy consolidated and won over
skeptics of liberal economics, markets were given more play across Latin America, including in
Mexico’s natural gas sector, and privatization made significant inroads on the Latin American
continent. The era of the Washington Consensus, which emphasized political democracy,
macroeconomic prudence, outward orientation, and liberalization of domestic markets, was at
hand.6
The Consensus turned out to be short-lived. Its failure can be attributed to Latin American
politicians, the shortage of international and domestic capital, international financial institutions,
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See John Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, D.C.:
International Institute for International Economics, 1990).
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and U.S. policymakers.7 During the Consensus, hydrocarbon rents went overwhelmingly to
private firms, while country after country suffered through general economic reforms whose
promised benefits turned out to be short-lived, if they materialized at all, and the poor and
indigenous suffered even more than prior to liberalization. The resulting political backlash
against the market has been understandable, if misplaced and counterproductive. Certainly one
cannot understand the rise and success of Hugo Chávez, president of Venezuela, without
understanding that the state-owned petroleum company, PDVSA, had previously lived in a
privileged reality. Despite its success exploiting the nation’s oil for domestic elites and
international partners, PDVSA contributed little to the life of the people (70 percent of whom
lived in poverty) in whose name it operated. Similarly, in Bolivia the largely indigenous poor
violently rejected national gas policy, which they viewed as favoring multinational companies
and national elites, despite the potential of significant discovery of natural gas and development
of important export markets.
Of course, market reforms were not rejected everywhere. In Brazil, President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso’s breakup of Petrobras’ monopoly, and even his partial privatization of the NOC, was
not reversed by his successor, Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party. Alberto
Fujimori’s reforms in Peru have thus far survived his overthrow and subsequent conviction on
human rights violations during his stormy decade as president, though popular protest is
continually bringing that policy into question. The administration of Alvaro Uribe in Colombia
has promoted even greater liberalization in the energy sector, including selling shares in
Ecopetrol, the national oil company.
The challenge, therefore, is to understand why a country works with or against market forces in
the energy sector. In this paper, I develop an argument about the determinants of energy policies
of oil and gas exporters. The remainder of the paper explores the impact of these energy policies
7

Nancy Birdsall and Augusto de la Torre, Washington Contentious: Economic Policies for Social Equity in Latin
America (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Inter-American Dialogue, 2001);
Joseph Stiglitz, “Challenging the Washington Consensus: An Interview with Lindsay Schoenfelder” Watson
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on global oil supply by applying the argument to the Latin American oil exporters— Venezuela,
Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, and Ecuador. The paper concludes by looking for ways to
influence the determinants of energy policy to ensure the development of the region’s resources
for the benefit of people within and beyond the region.
Resource Nationalism and Energy Security
If resource nationalism and energy security are useful concepts for thinking about energy policy,
we need to be clear on their definition, how they relate to each other, and how they affect global
energy supplies. The answer to the latter two questions can be boiled down to “it depends,” so it
becomes all the more important to understand the full nature of these two concepts before we can
address the issue of their impact on world markets.
Resource Nationalism
Resource nationalism is a concept in which the natural resources in the ground or under the sea
are the property of the nation rather than of a firm or individual who owns the surface area. In
this view, natural resources are a “national patrimony” and, consequently, should be used for the
benefit of the nation rather than for private gain. By historical tradition and political
constitutions, all Latin American countries currently own the subsoil resources in their political
jurisdiction (this includes offshore oil and gas). Although in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries governments generally had Liberal private property perspectives regarding
subsoil resources and may even have transferred ownership of these to private companies
through oil concessions, the practice has been virtually eliminated in the region. Today,
ownership of resources cannot be bartered or sold; instead, joint ventures, production-sharing
agreements, service contracts, and other arrangements determined by national legislation dictate
the permissible means through which parties other than the owner (the national government
acting in the name of the country) might have access to the subsoil resources.8 Most countries in
the world have similar ownership rules though, importantly, the United States and Western
Europe permit private ownership of subsoil rights.
8

For a discussion of the various types of contracts, see the Total corporate Web site,
http://www.total.com/en/corporate-social-responsibility/Ethical-Business-Principles/Financialtransparency/contractual_arrangements_13289.htm.
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One of the major challenges for energy policy in Latin America, however, is the new claim by
indigenous tribes that subsoil rights belong to them, not to the nation. Indigenous movements
advocating redress of 500 years of exploitation by colonial and national governments have
developed in many Latin American countries. Assisted by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) from the United States and Europe, and appealing to international norms that recognize
the rights of native peoples to control their territories and protect their cultures by remaining
isolated if they wish, indigenous groups have complicated the resource nationalism perspective.
Until a means is developed to resolve the tension between indigenous and national rights,
exploration and production will be negatively impacted.
A resource nationalist assumes that properly used hydrocarbon deposits result in the national
good. An underlying tenet is that the commodity itself has an intrinsic value, not one determined
by the market, and this value (“rents”) belongs to the nation.9 Since rents are earnings beyond
“normal” profit (by whichever of several definitions one chooses), and ownership of the resource
lies with the nation, the question of the distribution of rents between the resource owner and the
producer of oil arises. This distributional debate does not occur simply between developing
country governments and private companies. Now that many NOCs are investing internationally,
the distributional question can pit one government’s interests against another’s. For example, the
Brazilian NOC Petrobras has encountered difficulties in Ecuador as the government of Rafael
Correa exerts greater control over oil contracts. When Bolivia nationalized its gas fields in 2006,
again the company most affected was Petrobras. Even developed countries like Norway, the
United Kingdom, and Canada forced private oil companies to renegotiate their production
contracts when oil prices boomed. 10 And, of course, rents can be created by government
intervention that raises the price of an input (e.g., labor, equipment, and services required to be
purchased domestically, etc.) and these domestic actors can be powerful political forces in favor
of keeping those rents even at the cost of public goods foregone. Although often overlooked by
analysts focusing on international markets, the battle for rents is also fought in the domestic
9

See the position taken by the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) on Mexico’s energy reform,,”La
izquierda mexicana está unida en la defensa del petróleo nacional: Sandoval,” Nota N° 3760 Fundar: Centro de
Análisis e Investigación, http://www.fundar.org.mx/c_e/notas.htm, September 20, 2009.
10
Merrie Gilbert Klapp, The Sovereign Entrepreneur: Oil Policies in Advanced and Less Developed Capitalist
Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 76-81 and 92-93; Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi, “The
Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela” in Populism and Natural Resources, eds. William
Hogan and Federico Struzenegger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).
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political arena: between elite and poor, rural and urban populations, organized and unorganized
labor, large and small businesses, and a variety of other distinctions within the producing country
that have political salience.
The distribution of rents is particularly conflicted when contracts have not been designed to deal
with upward price volatility.11 Rents are appropriated by the resource owner of the asset largely
in two ways: royalties and taxes. (Other means of appropriating rents include dividends paid by
NOCs, increasing a company’s cost of business through redundant employment policies,
domestic content requirements, and responsibilities for social programs, bonuses, etc.) The
distribution of rents also becomes an issue domestically when important sectors of society
believe that they have not been receiving revenues commensurate with their development needs.
When society questions the representativeness of their public agents, the question of
appropriation of rents for private or public benefit can polarize politics and policymaking.
Resource nationalism is not simply a means by which government leaders might enrich
themselves and their cronies by selling the resource. The goal of RN is to maximize rent
appropriation to benefit national development; the means is by government setting the terms for
exploration, production, transportation, and distribution of energy. In addition to the rent
distribution issue noted above, two other matters dominate the resource nationalism agenda.
The issue that has gotten the most attention in contemporary times is who should extract the
resource, public or private firms. Since rents can be appropriated simply through various forms
of taxation of private enterprises or, more directly, by having a state-owned enterprise (SOE)
involved in the production and distribution of the resource, resource nationalists could favor
either. Each mechanism has its own advantages and disadvantages. Taxes on private enterprises
could be set at levels that still provide incentives for efficient upstream and downstream
operations, but private companies have information asymmetries that could result in the
government appropriating less rent than expected. If the state sets up its own NOC, it can
theoretically appropriate all the rents, but the reality is that NOCs are less efficient than private
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Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi, “The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela,” in
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firms, so the state loses potential earnings via this route. Resource nationalists who prefer the
NOC route to rent appropriation can be usefully characterized as “statists” because they prefer to
err on the side of too much government intervention; those who promote more effective
government regulation of private actors to capture rents are best identified as “reformers” within
a RN perspective. (In Latin America, those who believe that markets should function with
minimal government oversight are identified as neoliberals; today none of the major countries in
the region is governed by advocates of this position.)
The third issue dominating the RN agenda is to which market (foreign or domestic) the resources
should flow. Resource nationalists could seek to export as much as possible and to maximize rent
appropriation in order to invest in public goods for the benefit of the nation. In more radicalized
versions of resource nationalism, however, a distinction is made between markets for the elites
and benefits for the people. Exports can generate rents that elites use to maintain a polarized
social structure that permits them to accumulate political and economic power. Hence,
radicalized resource nationalists want the resource distributed at home first to meet the needs of
the people at the bottom of the social scale.
Energy Security
Turning to the second of our key concepts, energy security embodies a claim for government
action to protect national economic activity from shocks emanating from the international
market. Adjustment to a price shock from the international market could be market-based
(decreased use of this resource via either increased efficiency or reduced activity and a search for
alternative sources of energy). The time required for and the difficulty of increasing efficiency
and developing alternatives create adjustment costs that are not simply economic, but also
include social dislocation where jobs, consumption, and investment are affected; in addition,
political realignment, or even upheaval pursuant to a major social and economic adjustment
process, is also a source of concern to governments and their constituencies. Therefore, the usual
response to the external shock is not to let the market determine adjustment, but to adopt public
policies to mitigate at least some of those costs while market adjustments unfold.

9

Resource Nationalism and Energy Security in Latin America
The point of attempting to structure an energy policy to promote ES among consuming countries
is to minimize the adjustment costs that a reduction in volume or an increase in price has on the
national economy. This defense of the domestic economy can be pursued via government
regulation of private companies or consumers in national energy markets, or through direct state
provision of energy at subsidized prices. In either case, the policy goal of energy security implies
subordination of other policy goals (e.g., production of food, environmental protection, or
increased competitiveness of the national economy in world trade) to a more aggressive pursuit
of domestic supplies, price controls, and trade restrictions. In the United States, for example, in
the name of energy security we subsidize the domestic production of corn-based ethanol and
have high tariffs on the import of more efficient sugar cane-based ethanol.
While the concept of energy security first came to the fore in the United States and Western
Europe after the Arab oil embargo of 1973, it is an old concern in Latin America. Already in the
1920s major countries in the region were concerned about it. As the international market began
to shift into surplus in the late 1920s, and major oil companies colluded among themselves to
protect market share, their production in high-cost Latin America (Venezuela was the only lowcost producer) declined. Latin American countries had to use scarce foreign exchange to meet
domestic demand for crude or petroleum products at high oligopolistic prices. In addition, the
U.S. and British governments used access to loans (e.g., Colombia in the 1920s), the potential to
let rebels purchase arms (e.g., Mexico and Colombia in the 1920s), and diplomatic sanctions
(e.g., the British against Mexico after the 1938 nationalizations) to pressure Latin American
governments to accept their countries’ role in the global business plans of the major oil
companies. Recent debates regarding the future availability of oil and gas reflect both skepticism
about whether the Earth is running out of resources and concern for the environmental impact of
hydrocarbons. Thus, the search for answers today focuses on alternative sources of energy, as
well as on traditional sources. This difference has important ramifications since both consuming
and producing countries are now concerned about how unfavorable market forces might impact
the national welfare and security.
From the exporter’s perspective, the ES issue is whether the demand for oil and gas, and hence
national earnings, will be significantly reduced if a deep and global recession occurs or if more
10
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environmentally friendly sources of fuel become widely available.12 The loss in export revenue
could produce similar economic, social, and political adjustment issues for exporting countries as
described above for importers when the oil and gas markets are tight. In major exporting
countries, the specific route through which the impact is felt is often via a reduction in the rents
that had permitted the government to subsidize consumption of energy goods or to absorb a great
deal of low-skilled labor. In both Venezuela and Iran, riots broke out when governments
attempted to raise extremely low gasoline prices because export revenues were no longer
sufficient to cover the cost of the subsidies.13
The Relationship Between Resource Nationalism and Energy Security
With the definitions of RN and ES clarified, let’s examine the complex relationship between the
two at both the national and international levels. Under certain circumstances, a producing
country pursuing ES via cheap domestic energy can undermine RN by lowering the profitability
of the industry to the point that reserves are depleted and no new exploration is undertaken by
private firms; this is especially problematic because the NOC is usually too inefficient and
unskilled to pursue the requisite E&P. On the other hand, pursuing RN can undermine ES by
diminishing private investment and giving more control to a less effective NOC, resulting in
decreased productive capacity and, ultimately, supply shortages. At the international level, the
pursuit of ES by importing countries can fuel short-term strategies by producing countries to
capture more rents now (RN) before alternative sources of energy can be adopted on a large
scale. And, of course, large doses of RN in exporting countries can fuel increased efforts at ES in
importing countries. Yet, moderate levels of RN and ES can work together by creating a stable
level of political support in producing countries to export, and by convincing the public in
importing countries that oil and gas are scarce resources with high values whose use should be
more efficient.
12

See HRH Faisal Bin Turki, “Perspectives on the Saudi Arabian Energy Industry,” Royal Institute of International
Affairs in London, U.K. on December 2, 2000, http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2000/speeches/page0.aspx,
accessed September 20, 2009; Jad Mouawad,”Saudi Officials Seek to Temper the Price of Oil,” New York Times,
January 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/28/business/28oil.html.
13
Riots in multipleVenezuelan cities in 1989, known as the Caracazo, killed hundreds and forced the president to
declare a state of emergency. Moises Naim, Paper Tigers & Minotaurs: The Politics of Venezuela’s Economic
Reforms (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1993); Marc Wolfensberger, Bloomberg, “Tehran Revolts, Iran Rations
Gasoline, Sparks Protest in Tehran,” June 27, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601091&sid=a9HiN8aoQngM&refer=india#, accessed September
20, 2009.
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Graph 1 illustrates relationships between RN and ES in Latin America and shows that they can
change over time.
Graph 1.

Thus, for example, contemporary Mexico illustrates the case of resource nationalism with little
energy security—the country maintains a monopoly for Pemex; permits service contracts in
natural gas; and currently imports natural gas and gasoline, with crude perhaps to follow within a
decade. However, in 1980 the country’s energy policy scored high on both ES and RN—Mexico
maintained a monopoly for Pemex and limited exports. Chile in 1975 had an energy policy with
moderately low RN (the country allowed foreign participation in everything except oil
production, if any resources were discovered) and very low ES (its NOC, ENAP, operated in a
competitive market). After Argentina cut natural gas exports in 2004, the Chilean government
became more proactive in securing energy supplies, but still left the bulk of the effort to the
private sector, hence the country’s moderately low RN and moderate ES. In 1975, Brazil reduced
a focus on RN, which had dominated policy since the establishment of a monopoly for Petrobras
in 1953, to permit risk contracts with private firms as part of its increased drive for ES. In 1997,
12
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with the same concerns about ES, Petrobras was partially privatized, joint ventures with other
companies were permitted, and the NOC monopoly on imports was terminated, thus representing
a further decrease in RN.
Bolivia went from one extreme to the other. In 1997, it privatized its NOC (YPFB) with no
stipulations for extending the inadequately small domestic market; but in 2008, with a
reconstituted NOC, Brazil dramatically increased taxes and royalties and insisted on the
expansion of the domestic market.
The combination of little resource nationalism or energy security was illustrated in 1991, when
Argentina’s congress passed legislation to begin the privatization process for its NOC (YPF) and
the government of Carlos Menem (1989-1999) favored complete market adjustment for exports
and the domestic market. RN became a moderate policy goal in 2004 when the new NOC,
ENARSA, was created to compete in the market; ES simultaneously became a prime goal when
exports were discouraged via taxes and quotas.
The Political Economy of Latin American Energy Policy
Policy is Politics
Any discussion of energy policy should begin with an understanding and appreciation that public
policy is politics. Public policy is about making tradeoffs among desirable goals; the priorities
that determine those tradeoffs reflect what people in the society want and the costs they are
willing to pay.
To put the Latin American experience in perspective, it is useful to begin by looking at some
elements of U.S public policy on energy. For instance, the United States has a great deal of oil
and natural gas in the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR); Congress has severely limited
access to multiple Alaskan sites largely in favor of environmental priorities. California has
significant offshore natural gas reserves and a long coastline that could accommodate LNG
regasification terminals. But Californians have successfully lobbied Congress and the state
legislature to effectively prohibit offshore drilling and construction of LNG facilities; the state
13
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therefore pays higher prices for its energy-rich lifestyle to attain both environmental and
perceived safety goals. While vested interests influence these policies, none of these tradeoffs are
irrational or imposed on the public; they are simply the result of the priorities of U.S. and
California citizens.
Latin Americans also have multiple goals and debate priorities. There is agreement across the
political spectrum that countries face many challenges in today’s energy market and that current
policies are not adequate. But in deciding how to effectively respond to these challenges, Latin
Americans are finding they have to decide how they will balance issues of control
(overproduction rates and the distribution of rents), the domestic distribution of export revenue,
and their own energy security. We should not be surprised, therefore, that energy policymaking
in the region is slow and contentious.
Explaining Latin American Energy Policy
The context for an energy policy is set by geology, the international market for oil and gas, and
the country’s macro-history, but the specifics of energy policy, that is, how much resource
nationalism and energy security inform the government’s policy in the energy sector, is
determined by the degree of inclusiveness in the political system, the competitiveness of politics,
and the innovative and risk-taking characteristics of the leader. These three variables will interact
to make more or less likely the choice of an energy policy that emphasizes RN and ES.
Sustainability of the policy chosen is determined by the capacity of the government to turn oil
and gas-generated rents into public benefit. These are not just academic lessons, nor relevant
simply to countries that have chosen extreme positions on resource nationalism and energy
security. After taking a moderate position for a decade, Brazil is reconsidering its energy policy
in light of the immense oil and gas discoveries in the country’s pre-salt layers. On the pro-market
side, Peru is in great danger of having its successes in exploration, production, and the
development of export markets for its natural gas overthrown in the streets by a public unhappy
with the distribution of benefits so far. Thus, understanding a nation’s standing on the following
three variables will shed light on policy choice and sustainability.

14
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Inclusiveness
Inclusion is defined not in terms of who the system claims to represent, but in terms of who has
the ability to influence the selection of a government and its policies. Groups that are included
are “empowered” 14 within the system. Inclusion, therefore, is determined by the provision of
public goods that address those interests, as well the provision of private goods to that group.
Voting alone is insufficient to demonstrate inclusiveness 15 —the 1990s saw a number of
presidents elected in Latin America on anti-liberal platforms and, once in office, they adopted
those policies against which they had campaigned.16
In the contemporary era, the poor and the indigenous have been empowered and demand
participation as independent actors and not just as symbolic beneficiaries. Riots in the streets can
bring down presidents (e.g., Ecuador in 1996, 2001, and 2005; Bolivia in 2003 and 2005; and
Argentina in 2001) or save them (e.g., Venezuela in 2003), but the impact of the rioters on what
policy is actually adopted depends upon their having access to the institutions where policy is
made.
The impact of the “inclusiveness of political system” variable, ceteris paribus, on energy policy
stability and character is outlined below. Note that while inclusiveness is desirable morally and
politically, unless counterbalanced by the “competitive and leadership” variables discussed later
in this paper, it will produce poor energy policy.
•

Political systems that exclude significant portions of their politically active groups will be
unstable (voting is not sufficient to constitute inclusiveness), and thus their energy policy
will be unstable.

•

Political systems that exclude significant portions of their politically active groups will be
more likely to favor rent appropriation for provision of private over public goods.
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See Angelo Bonfiglioli, Empowering the Poor (New York: United Nations Capital Development Fund, 2003),
especially pages 41-58. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010168.pdf, accessed
September 20, 2009.
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Consequently, the concept of a “selectorate,” used by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators, is broader
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Susan C. Stokes, Mandates and Democracies: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America (Cambridge:
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– If the exclusionary coalition favors capital, there will be less RN and ES,
with a proliferation of unregulated private monopolies and oligopolies.
– If the exclusionary coalition favors labor, there will be more RN and ES,
with NOCs under direct control of the government.
•

Political systems that are highly inclusive will have governing coalitions that are
correspondingly larger, and thus will generate pressures for greater control of rents in
order to have resources to reward members.
– Inclusiveness pulls in the direction of greater resource nationalism.
– Inclusiveness pulls in the direction of greater energy security.

•

Political systems that are highly inclusive will have broad political support, and thus:
– As long as market conditions generate high rents, their energy policies will
be stable.
– If market conditions soften and rents fall, their energy policies will be
unstable as governments seek ways to squeeze more rents out of a smaller pie
to support the level of private goods they have been distributing.

Competitiveness
The second key variable in the model addresses competition for control of the deliberative body
that makes policy: does it alternate among rivals, or remain under the control of a single
constituency, that is, the groups and individuals who support the people in office? A constituency
wants the people it supports in government to make public policy in their specific interest—if
public goods are produced along the way, fine, but businesspeople and homeowners want tax
breaks, unions want benefits for unionized workers, and so forth. Investing the nation’s wealth in
physical and human infrastructure may be beneficial to society as a whole, but a politician’s
constituency may very well demand private goods. The natural constituency for public goods is
rare and limited; think of a philanthropist.
It shouldn’t be a surprise, then, that in Latin America the recently included poor and indigenous
groups want private goods to be allocated in the name of justice and national development. After
almost 200 years of their country’s independence, the poor and indigenous continue to lack
decent and stable employment, education, and health care because governments have historically
16
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emphasized providing private goods to the elites and middle class, and invested little in public
goods.17 It is hard for these newly empowered groups, therefore, to perceive their demands for
private goods as unjust or problematic. When these groups comprise significant numbers of the
citizenry in a country with large reserves of natural resources (the percentage of people living
below the poverty line ranges from Brazil’s 31 percent to Bolivia’s 60 percent for all of our
cases, except Argentina’s 23 percent),18 it is difficult for leaders who hope to get elected or reelected to argue that reforming public policy in a manner that is sustainable over the medium to
long term is better than simply redistributing today’s wealth. Those who wish to lead these newly
included groups will find it necessary to emphasize their ability to provide private goods
immediately and significantly (e.g., ordering an agency to install a health clinic in a district
because of the way it voted rather than its assessed ranking in terms of health care needs).
Despite the fact that constituencies are self-centered, some governments manage to work with
markets in ways that promote efficiency and effectiveness, while others largely promote the
private gain of their constituencies. Political competition within the deliberative body that
designs policy (e.g., the legislature in a democracy) is the key to getting politicians to view the
delivery of public goods as furthering their career interests.19 Competition is determined by
whether control over the deliberative body and presidency shifts between rival political forces.
Competition for control of the deliberative body affects the private-public tradeoff in public
policy in multiple ways, though it only reduces—rather than eliminates—private goods.20 Since
democratic governing coalitions consist of multiple partners, it is difficult to build one capable of
winning at the national level and rewarding each partner solely with private goods; hence, the
coalition will seek to generate public goods, as well. In addition, when rival political groups are
evenly balanced, they will have equal access to patronage. Distributing patronage in this
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situation provides no relative advantage. The development of state capacity and the provision of
public goods provide only a short-term advantage with the voters. Competition also diminishes
the cost of losing an election. Because no coalition can be sure of winning the next time, chances
are that the winning coalition today will not use its position to institutionalize increased
patronage to the party in power; without dominating patronage distribution, the winning coalition
will find it difficult to break the competitive cycle.
Finally, competitive political systems are more likely to develop independent legal systems to
protect what is broadly known as property rights—which include not only physical property, but
contractual obligations and civil rights. Since everyone knows that, at some point, their group
will not be running the government, they will want protection from the times when others are in
office and thus will seek to institutionalize the rule of law.
With reference to energy policy, once politicians decide that satisfying their constituencies
requires the use of natural resource rents for the production of public goods, they need to build
the state capacity to generate, capture, and use those rents. In the energy sector, the promotion of
an effective energy policy includes creating competition in exploration and production, open
access to transportation pipelines, and effective regulation at times when natural monopolies
form and operate. In the case of countries with a national oil company, the public goods
provision is furthered not only by making it compete with other companies, but also keeping it
independent of the patronage needs of government and insuring that it has sufficient capital to
operate effectively.
The impact of competitiveness on energy policy can be usefully summarized as follows:
•

A political system with low levels of competitiveness will develop an energy policy that
produces private goods for distribution to the dominant coalition’s constituency.
– If the dominant coalition favors the private sector, energy policy will score
low on RN and ES, but there will be little effective regulation, and monopolies
will characterize the energy sector.
– If the dominant coalition favors the poor, energy policy will score high on RN
and ES, with little effective regulation to prevent the NOC from essentially
18
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serving as a mechanism for the distribution of private goods to the coalition’s
constituency.
•

The more competitive the political system, the less energy policy will be characterized by
resource nationalism and energy security.
– Both RN and ES generate (see earlier discussion), as well as appropriate,
rents. In a highly competitive environment, leaders focus on providing public
goods and will be concerned about their long-term credibility with investors.
Hence, they will not seek to modify contracts retroactively every time prices
rise (a characteristic of RN); nor will they introduce supply-focused regulations
that generate rents at the expense of increasing supply (a characteristic of ES).
– Groups and leaders in a competitive system will be less likely to attempt to
capture maximum rents in the short-term because their need to reward
constituencies renders them more public goods-oriented.

•

An independent and effective regulator is more likely to be established if the political
system is competitive.

Leadership—Innovation and Risk Acceptance
The third and final key variable relates to whether a country’s leader is innovative and willing to
accept risks. Political leaders function within varying constraints; they may retain important
discretionary capacities and, therefore, have an ability to make a fundamental difference in
policy.21 Leaders are not just a sounding board for their constituencies; they may be able to tap
into the demands of those who are, or could become, politically relevant. Whether or not leaders
can take advantage of opportunities to innovate within the constraints or push beyond them
depends on their personal characteristics for innovation and the acceptance of risk.
Innovation in policy is the development of a new vision or strategy, not just the offering of an
alternative idea. It is defined in the national context and thus is determined by whether anyone in
leadership positions has pushed these policy positions in the past. Risk acceptance is determined
by whether the leader takes proposals against the perspectives of his own party or constituency
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(moderate degree of risk), or the leader challenges key government actors (Congress, the
Supreme Court, or the military) who could cause his impeachment or overthrow (high degree of
risk).
Innovation is an important characteristic that determines whether a leader is seeking to follow or
restrain markets. Creating an independent regulatory agency is innovative in the national context
because it dramatically alters existing patterns of rent appropriation and distribution. It is also
risky because the expected increase in production and rents will be the result not only of the
incentives provided by the government (and therefore controllable), but also geology and the
state of the international market (circumstances that leaders do not control). If an innovative
leader is seeking to restrain the market (private investment or consumption), she will have a plan
for either effectively replacing private actors or creating incentives to induce them to adjust their
business plans in accordance with the new policy.
Risk acceptance is important for two reasons. If a leader has new ideas but is timid about putting
them on the agenda, institutional constraints will determine whether he puts forth the proposals.
Only under very loose constraints will a risk-averse leader propose new ideas that do not have
the possibility of immediate support. In contrast, a leader who is risk-acceptant and has new
ideas will be quite willing to seek to create the political conditions that mitigate the institutional
constraints. The combination of risk acceptance and lack of innovation is dangerous; it suggests
a leader who is willing to push ahead on poorly conceived new ideas or ideas from a failed past.
The leader who is both innovative and risk acceptant fits the category others have labeled a
“political entrepreneur.” A political entrepreneur characterized by a high degree of risk
acceptance is a “radical,” and she may be radical in the advocacy of pro-market or statist
positions. The moderately risk acceptant leader, in turn, fits Hirschman’s classic category of a
“reformmonger,”22 and could advocate pro-market or statist reforms.
These personal characteristics affect energy policymaking in the context of the inclusiveness and
competitiveness of the political system. Table 1 illustrates the relationship between leader
characteristics and institutional constraints.
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Table 1.
Leader Characteristics and Institutional Constraints
Risk Acceptant?
Yes

No

Yes

Pushes new ideas while
seeking to alter
institutional constraints

If institutional context is
permissive, pushes new
ideas

No

Takes full advantage of
institutional
permissiveness to put
issue on agenda but
pushes old ideas

Reacts to events by
sticking to traditional
policy positions; strong
hand of history

Innovative?

An understanding of the independent power of each of the three variables—inclusiveness,
competitiveness, and leader characteristics—permits us to detail how their interaction will affect
energy policy. Three potential combinations are particularly interesting and relevant to the
investigation of Latin America’s likely contribution to future global oil supplies:
Combination 1
High Inclusiveness + High Competitiveness + Innovative and Highly Risk Acceptant Leader 
Leader will push for ways to get around deliberative body’s constraints to provide private goods
for constituency (high on RN and ES), but energy policy will be unstable. (Example: Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela, 1998-2002.)
Chávez’ governing coalition has been built on the poor who had voted in the past, but
nonetheless bore the brunt of the austerity programs adopted by governments when oil prices fell
in the 1980s and 1990s. Chávez depends significantly upon not only the periodic vote of the
poor, but their willingness to take to the streets and engage politically every day in their
neighborhoods and workplaces (high inclusiveness). In the early period of Chávez’ rule, from
1998 to 2002, the opposition and Chávez both perceived the possibility of electoral defeats (high
competitiveness), and Chávez was clearly innovative and highly risk acceptant (e.g., his 1992
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coup attempt against what was widely perceived as a stable democratic system was the first in
over 30 years and did not include the senior military officers). Chávez made initial moves in the
direction of RN with a new petroleum law in 2001, but did not implement it and did not
restructure PDVSA despite having difficulties with a succession of the NOC’s presidents.
Energy policy was stable despite uncertainty raised by the new petroleum law.
Combination 2
High Inclusiveness + Low Competitiveness + Innovative and Highly Risk Acceptant Leader 
Leader will have free hand to provide private goods for constituency (high on RN and ES);
stability of energy policy will depend on market conditions. (Example: Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela, 2003 to present.)
In this case, the opposition rallies in the streets, has access to print and online media (though the
extent of this has diminished over time), can run in elections (again, with increasing restrictions
on specific individuals), and can vote. (This set of characteristics constitutes high inclusiveness
since politicians will represent government and opposition voters.) The April 2002 military coup
and the petroleum workers’ strike that paralyzed PDVSA in December of that year, and that was
supported by the civilian opposition, indicate that the opposition no longer saw the possibility of
winning elections (low competitiveness). Chávez has since been free to move increasingly into
an RN and ES direction by raising taxes, nationalizing the heavy oil projects and some service
company operations, and threatening greater nationalization if service contracts are not
renegotiated in line with the decline in oil prices.
The determinants of the most efficient and effective energy policy are illustrated in the third
combination considered here. The inclusive nature of the political system means that every major
group in society believes that they are represented in the political system to the extent that their
needs are given serious consideration in all relevant policies. Each group would prefer that
policy be made in its own interest, i.e., provided private goods, but will make use of public goods
as well. But because politics is competitive and the constituencies of politicians are large (due to
the inclusive character of the political system), politicians are pushed in the direction of
designing policy that produces more public than private goods. (No political system can ever
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eliminate the provision of private goods.) The provision of public goods means that society as a
whole is receiving benefits, thus consolidating the inclusiveness of the political system. The
innovative but cautious leader can discover a focal point to bring competing forces in the
legislature together, but will not push his own constituency’s agenda in a game of chicken with
the legislature.
Combination 3
High Inclusiveness + High Competitiveness + Innovative and Moderate Risk Acceptant Leader
 Leader will accept the demands from Congress for the provision of public goods as a way to
meet the demands from a highly inclusive constituency (lower levels of RN and ES). President
will be a key advocate of innovation in energy policy, especially in regard to an independent
regulator. Energy policy will be stable. (Example: Alvaro Uribe in Colombia, 2002 to present.)
The Constitution of 1991 significantly increased the inclusive character of Colombia’s
democracy. Uribe is innovative (he dramatically altered the government’s strategy in fighting the
FARC and FLN guerrillas) and he is moderately risk acceptant (his pursuit of a constitutional
amendment to permit his reelection to a third term has been slow and cautious). Energy policy
has moved significantly away from RN and ES in Uribe’s two terms in office. In 2002, royalties
were decreased; in 2003, the mandatory 30 percent share for the NOC in all projects was
eliminated; in 2004, an independent regulator was created; and in 2007, 10 percent of shares in
the NOC were sold to the public. The pro-market orientation of the Uribe government has not
been seriously questioned and his public standing remains high at the end of his two terms in
office.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil (1995–2002) is another innovative but cautious leader.
While Minister of Planning he devised the Real Plan to halt hyperinflation; as president, he
pursued the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the establishment of an
independent regulatory agency in the energy sector. But when Congress and society indicated an
unwillingness to pursue that path in the energy sector, he settled for breaking the Petrobras
monopoly and selling shares in the NOC without surrendering management control.
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Latin America’s Contemporary Oil Geopolitics
What does this analysis suggest about contemporary energy policy in the region and its impact
on global oil supplies? The global supply context was extremely favorable for energy exporters
over the past five years, and though prices fell significantly at the end of 2008, they seem to have
recovered to a still-high $70 per barrel level. Yet in the past, high petroleum prices contributed to
severe economic and political challenges within the exporting countries, with disastrous results
for the ruling coalition (e.g., Venezuela’s traditional parties had trouble managing the 1973-1980
bonanza, and this failure contributed to their collapse in the 1990s). The needs of the poor are so
immense, and the appetites of the military and some political allies are so great, that a leader’s
policies can easily exceed the parameters created by whatever revenues oil brings to their
countries.
Oil exporters who find themselves overstretched financially and under pressure from their
political constituency may seek to transfer to international energy markets as much of the cost as
possible of confronting a domestic economic and political crisis. If adopted, this strategy will
push energy policy to the RN and ES extremes. Included in this category are likely to be the
governments of Chávez in Venezuela and Correa in Ecuador. Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-present) in Argentina may be pulling away from
populism, given their defeat in the 2009 congressional elections. Lula is being tempted to move
further along the RN and ES axes, but will be limited by the competitive nature of Brazilian
politics. With no chance for reelection to a third term, however, he might try to use his executive
powers to push beyond congressional constraints. But without the support of Congress, he won’t
be able to nationalize existing contracts and may have to exchange Petrobras monopolies in
transportation and distribution to secure an effective nationalization of the pre-salt reserves.
Colombia seems likely to continue on a path that is low on both RN and ES. The Colombian
constitution of 1991 facilitated incorporating the poor and indigenous into the system in a
stabilizing fashion. Mexico is also likely to move in a centrist direction on energy policy after the
PRI’s (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) 2009 congressional victories and the demise of the
PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática), since Pemex lacks the capital and skills to develop
the Chicontepec field in the short-term and the Gulf of Mexico in the medium-term. Since PRI
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has the potential of regaining the presidency in 2012 after 12 years out of power, one should
expect the party to support reforms now so that the new president can enjoy its fruits.
We should consider some scenarios for the short- to medium-term in more detail, highlighting
the three variables, as we think about how Latin American energy policy could impact global
energy markets, IOCs, and the United States. The challenges posed by countries led by statist
leaders and scoring high on RN and ES draw our attention first; then we move on to the energy
policies of countries that are led by reformists and characterized by lower levels of RN and ES.
In recent history, democratic neoliberal leaders Menem in Argentina, Sánchez de Lozada in
Bolivia, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990-2000) represented the extreme versions of market
orientation (not even the neoliberal military dictatorships in Argentine [1976-1982] or Chile
[1973-1989] privatized their NOCs, as did Menem and Lozada). But neoliberalism is currently in
disrepute in the region (the Argentine is in disgrace, the Bolivian is under indictment for deaths
resulting from his order to suppress street demonstrations, and the Peruvian is serving 25 years
for corruption and human rights violations), and so it is not relevant to speculate about neoliberal
scenarios for the near future. Three scenarios are worth considering within the statist and
reformist groupings: leaders consolidate their rule, leaders find their rule likely to be limited, and
leaders are forcibly ejected from office by the violent protests of the opposition.
The Statists
Scenario 1: Statists monopolize the government
Among Latin American oil exporters, this scenario is relevant to contemporary Venezuela and
Ecuador because statists have won landslide elections and reelections; both Chávez and Correa
have high levels of risk acceptance. Scenario 1 requires that international oil prices remain high
enough to permit these administrations to extend their inefficient provision of social services to
the poor, as well as appease their militaries. It also requires that Chávez and Correa be successful
in creating umbrella organizations that subsume all of the political parties that support their
governments under their direct control. As a result, support for the statists will continue to soar
and their political allies will continue to see the benefits of reinforcing their respective leader’s
legitimacy and control. In terms of our model, the inclusiveness of the political system is high,
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the competitiveness of politics is low, and these two leaders are not only innovative but also
quite risk-acceptant.
In this situation, oil supplies to international markets will slowly decrease as investment dries up
in the face of greater returns to the governments and the poor, with corresponding increases in
costs to other consumers, governments, and IOCs, even within Latin America. One should
expect the oil geopolitics of these countries to have the following characteristics:
•

Leaders will work to strengthen OPEC in accordance with the strategy of maintaining
high prices.

•

These leaders will work together to strengthen regimes opposed to U.S.-led
globalization. Only Chávez can deliver on aid, however, and he is unlikely to be as
generous as his rhetoric because of domestic needs (social programs as well as
infrastructure investment) and the declining productivity of PDVSA.

•

The promotion of Latin American and Caribbean energy integration centered on
Venezuela will slow as a result of diminished resources and increased tensions within
the region.

•

These leaders will seek E&P alliances with NOCs of like-minded governments as a
way of pressuring both the U.S. government and the IOCs to negotiate political and
economic relationships closer to the resource nationalists’ preferred terms.

•

Venezuela and Ecuador will continue to export to the U.S. market even as they seek
to complement it with new markets because the U.S. market is the most profitable for
both countries. But exports to the United States will decrease as a result of the abovementioned decline in production, and the alliances with NOCs seeking to supply
domestic over world markets.

Scenario 2: Statists remain in power, but politics grows more competitive, thereby raising the
possibility that they will lose the next election
This scenario has two versions, depending upon whether the statist leaders are moderately or
highly risk acceptant. The scenario applies to Argentina after the summer 2009 legislative
elections, but could also apply to Venezuela and Ecuador if a decline in oil revenues undermines
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their populist programs, to Mexico if the nationalist wing of the PRI wins the 2012 presidential
election, and to Colombia and Brazil if the next presidents are statist.
2a: Moderately Risk Acceptant
These leaders (Brazil’s Lula, Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and potential
successors in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia) recognize the limits to promoting
resource nationalism and energy security and focus on consolidating the gains already achieved.
We can see the impact of the political context on Lula’s new proposals for dealing with the oil
and gas deposits discovered in the pre-salt layers. The need for congressional approval and
capital to finance the extraordinarily costly E&P, as well as the public and private goods
Congress will be expected to generate in light of these oil riches, mean that even a president who
comes from the Worker’s Party on the left isn’t using the specter of a bonanza to join the ranks
of the statist resource nationalists. His proposal thus requires private investors to associate with
Petrobras in parts of the gigantic Tupi field but not elsewhere, and is not retroactive. The private
sector is thus expected to continue to be a significant partner.23 The Kirchners in Argentina,
meanwhile, seem to be moderating in the face of growing opposition over the last year,
culminating in their recent losses in congressional elections.24
The energy policies of these moderately risk-acceptant statists will be stable and will seek to
increase the role of the private sector, albeit under continued state supervision. In the Mexican
case, private participation in the oil sector will continue to be limited to the provision of services
to Pemex, but the terms will have sufficient incentives to bring private firms into the service
contract regime. The promotion of the domestic market over exports (ES) will become
restrained. As a result, oil supplies to the global market should grow moderately.
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The oil geopolitics of the moderate statists facing domestic political competition should have the
following characteristics:
•

If in OPEC (Brazil will join in this scenario), support the organization’s efforts to
promote higher prices but don’t take a leadership role. Cheat on your quota when
production increases.

•

Offer IOCs a small improvement in contract terms without undercutting the NOC.

•

Seek alliances with NOCs of “respectable” countries (e.g., no to Iran or Russia, but
yes to China).

•

Stay out of the fray between the United States and regional countries seeking to
promote anti-American alliances.

2b: Highly Risk-Acceptant
These statist leaders (Chávez and Correa, potential successor in Brazil, but unlikely in Colombia
or Mexico) must retain enough control over the military and enough influence among the poor to
convince opponents that they cannot be overthrown, even as politics radicalize. But their rule
would be unstable because, in this scenario, they cannot capture enough resources to satisfy their
constituencies (the deliberative body is competitive), and the opposition retains control over
some key assets that enable them to speak and act against the government (the system is
inclusive). In this context, the high risk-acceptant leaders will be frustrated and worried that they
might be overthrown at some point or that they will lose the next legislative or presidential
election (Mexico does not permit reelection). They will increasingly lash out against their
“enemies” and seek to squeeze even more out of private investors using executive powers in
order to materially and ideologically placate their supporters.
In this situation, the supply to international markets from these countries will be unstable, with a
tendency downward as politicization of their NOCs and the transfer of its resources toward social
and military programs increase even more. Under these conditions, one should expect the highly
risk-acceptant statists’ oil geopolitical strategy to have the following characteristics:
•

Leaders will work to strengthen OPEC in accordance with the strategy of maintaining
high prices. Brazil would join OPEC.
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•

Countries will see continued instability in contract terms with IOCs because the
NOC’s inefficiencies will limit its productive capacity at the same time that the
statists’ demands upon them increase. In the Brazilian case, Petrobras will be unable
to contribute its share in the new production associations for the pre-salt projects and
partners will be expected to front more of the costs.

•

These countries will seek E&P alliances with NOCs of like-minded governments as a
way of pressuring both the U.S. government and the IOCs to negotiate political and
economic relationships closer to the resource nationalists’ preferred terms.

•

Countries will continue to promote anti-Americanism and instability both in the
Americas and globally in order to encourage speculation that will drive prices higher,
and to try to polarize domestic politics in order to increase the likelihood of building a
dominant political movement.

•

Countries will increase efforts to develop Latin American and the Caribbean energy
integration centered on Venezuelan oil and gas, complemented by the promise of
Mexican oil in the future. Because of Venezuela’s vast resources and Chávez’
promotion of “Socialism of the 21st Century,” the statists will seek to convince their
constituencies that Venezuela is able and willing to bankroll those who emulate him.

Scenario 3: Statists are overthrown, with two sub-scenarios based on how the poor and
indigenous respond
This scenario is foreseeable in Venezuela and Ecuador, but relevant to the other oil exporters
only if new statist leaders are highly risk-acceptant and promote the polarization of domestic
politics in support of their policies. The scenario is likely to develop only in the context of a
severe domestic economic collapse and a sustained decline of oil prices into the low $40 per
barrel range or less. This would dramatically slow Mexican exploitation of its large Chicontepec
field and the development of the Brazilian pre-salt fields because international sources of capital
for those expensive and risky projects would dry up. An economic collapse can occur in
Venezuela and Ecuador even with oil prices in the $50-$60 per barrel range if inflation
accelerates in these countries, and oil output continues to suffer from lack of investment; neither
Mexico nor Brazil is sufficiently dependent on oil revenues to suffer a similar fate merely
because prices settle in at these levels.
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In Venezuela and Ecuador, the poor and indigenous can be expected to take to the streets as the
statists’ largesse dries up. The military will be called upon by the governments to intervene, but
they will be reluctant to use force. The political opposition will be rejuvenated. Radical statists
will turn increasingly to violence to regain control of the streets, and the military will be forced
to decide whether they are simply supporters of the current government or whether the time has
come to declare that the statists have lost the ability to govern.25 If the rioting is severe enough,
the military will be expected to step in to “save” the country, though not to run it.
3a: Poor and indigenous demobilized
In this situation, the affected countries will likely increase their supply to global markets as the
new governments will be more market oriented than the statists and will not face immediate
demands from the poor and indigenous for benefits. These groups will become demobilized
either because a repressive regime engages in massive human rights violations to terrorize them
into demobilization, or because they are exhausted after the failure of the statists’ experiments
with direct democracy.
Policy will be unstable in the medium term, however, unless the new energy policy provides
public goods and the poor and indigenous are reincorporated into the political system, Congress
becomes competitive, and the new leader is both innovative and cautious.
•

While not leaving OPEC, the new governments will push for higher export quotas
and cheat on their own quotas.

•

The new government will move away from RN and ES.

•

The new leaders will draw their countries closer to the United States and seek to
undercut regional support for the remaining statists.

•

The NOCs will be returned to professional management and new relationships with
IOCs will be sought to help the company recover and the country to export. Given the
pent-up demand for infrastructure investments and private goods for elites out of
power for a decade or more, these countries are likely to adopt export strategies that
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maximize income via a supply rather than a price-per-barrel strategy. IOCs are likely
to earn greater returns as resource nationalism and energy security recede.
3b: Poor and indigenous remain mobilized (power in the streets)
In this situation, political inclusiveness is low as the poor and indigenous remain mobilized and
largely leaderless, with the populist leaders and their close associates eliminated as political
actors. Congress will rank low on competitiveness because any party advocating public over
private goods investment will be banned due to presumed links to poor and indigenous rioting in
the streets. The new president will be cautious and unlikely to be an innovator because he will
fear for the stability of the new political system. No post-populism government will be able to
govern the country, and a succession of coups will likely ensue as the military resents its use by
the post-populist governments to attempt to control the streets. Supply instabilities will ensue in
the domestic market, and the countries will become unreliable partners in international and
regional energy markets.
•

The new government will accuse OPEC of being under the control of statists,
renounce their membership, and strive to export as much oil and gas as possible.

•

The new government will move away from RN and ES.

•

Supply to the international market will be disrupted as a consequence of a backlash
by the poor against the installations of the IOCs and the NOCs now regarded as under
the control of international capital.

•

The new leaders will draw their countries closer to the United States and seek to
undercut regional support for the remaining statists.

•

The NOCs will be returned to professional management and new relationships with
IOCs will be sought to help the company recover and the country to export. Given the
pent-up demand for infrastructure investments and private goods for elites out of
power for a decade or more, these countries are likely to adopt export strategies that
maximize income via a supply rather than price per barrel strategy. IOCs are likely to
earn greater returns as resource nationalism and energy security recede.
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The Reformists
Resource nationalists and energy security statists are not the only leaders who face challenges to
their energy policies. Today’s reformists operate within a Latin American tradition in which
ownership of the subsoil resources belongs to the nation, a framework that limits how far they
will move toward a market orientation in the energy sector. Nevertheless, the reformers have
been pursuing energy policies characterized by lower levels of resource nationalism and energy
security than have been seen in decades. Among Latin America’s oil exporters today, the reform
group is represented more moderately by Alvaro Uribe in Colombia and Felipe Calderón in
Mexico, and the list may be augmented by their own successors, as well as by those in Brazil and
Argentina.
Exploration of how this reform group would fare under monopolization of the government,
competition, and overthrow yields the following scenarios.
Scenario 4: Reformists monopolize government
In this scenario, the political coalition behind these leaders becomes dominant at least at the
national level, even if not at the provincial one. The leader can be expected to win reelection if
permitted to run (e.g., there have been discussions about modifying the constitution a second
time to permit Uribe to run for a third term), or if the leader is termed out, members of her
coalition would win election. The political system remains inclusive but politics are monopolized
by the leader’s coalition. In terms of our model, the inclusiveness of the political system is high
but the competitiveness of politics is low, thus generating pressure for oil and gas rents to be
used for private goods. In these circumstances, whether or not the leader is innovative and riskacceptant, he will support an energy policy that generates rents for private goods because that is
what his constituency wants; since his coalition controls Congress, he can provide it as long as
the rents keep coming in. Note that in this scenario, the reformer becomes satisfied with his
ability to provide private goods and abandons his earlier claims about the importance of reform
for the provision of public goods. No current or foreseeable reformists in the oil exporting
countries fit into this scenario.
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Scenario 5: Reformists in a competitive political environment
Contemporary Latin America provides two sub-scenarios for reformists in a competitive political
environment, distinguished by the degree of inclusiveness of the political system.
5a: Political system is highly inclusive
In the first sub-scenario, the political system is inclusive and the Congress is competitive.
Competition forces Congress to support an energy policy that provides public goods. Brazil
under Cardoso and Uribe in Colombia26 are in this sub-scenario; their successors, and perhaps
Argentina in 2011, may fall into this scenario. Oil supplies to the international market will
increase from the countries with reformist administrations.
One should expect reformist leaders in an inclusive and competitive environment to have the
following characteristics in their oil geopolitical strategies:
•

The countries will seek to maximize exports in the near term, diminishing ES.

•

Better terms will be offered to national and foreign investors throughout the energy
chain, moderating RN and capturing moderately high levels of rents.

•

The leaders will play active roles in pursuing regional energy integration based on
market signals.

•

The governments will seek closer ties to the United States, both as export markets for
energy and as promoters of greater regional energy integration.

5b: Political system is moderately inclusive
The other sub-scenario for reformist leaders facing competitive politics finds Mexico in a unique
situation: moderate levels of inclusiveness, high competitiveness, and an innovative and cautious
president. The political system is the least inclusive of the countries in the study.
Among the many challenges facing the Mexican political system: many people believe the PRD
was deprived of victories in the 1988 and 2006 presidential elections; the FZLN guerrilla

26

The FARC no longer represents a political movement for change; its persistence as a drug trade and kidnappingfueled criminal organization poses no challenge to the inclusive nature of the Colombian political system.
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movement has widespread legitimacy (unlike the FARC in Colombia);27 the violent teachers’
strikes in Oaxaca had significant citizen support;28 and the attractiveness of the drug traffickers’
way of life (memorialized in the popular ballads heard on radio stations across northern Mexico).
The country’s politics are extremely competitive, both within Congress and at the level of the
presidency. At worst, the leftist party PRD barely lost the last presidential election, the
polymorphous PRI party is expected to win the 2012 presidential election in light of its
impressive midterm congressional victories in 2009, and the last two presidents hailed from the
pro-market PAN party. Mexico has the most resource nationalist character in the region, yet its
energy policy scores low on the energy security criteria, but more because of the weight of
resource nationalism than from a conviction that the market can provide the appropriate supply
of energy at acceptable prices.
Calderón in Mexico has an important opportunity to make significant changes in energy policy
that will decrease resource nationalism slightly (akin to the levels of Venezuela) and increase
energy security significantly. But this will only come at the expense of his own party’s likely
future in the next elections because PRI controls the reform process in Congress and will only
approve reforms for which it can take credit. It cannot alienate the nationalists and win in 2012,
but it will also want a more effective energy sector if it wins in 2012; hence, PRI should seek
further reforms in the energy sector. Calderón has already demonstrated his innovative nature in
working with Congress to pass important, though still limited, reforms in the non-energy sectors;
now he has to take the risk of putting his historical legacy ahead of his party’s chances in the
next presidential election. If Calderón succeeds, Mexico’s geopolitical oil and gas strategy will
move slightly away from RN, but remain outside the range defined by Colombia and Brazil. Oil
supplies to the international market will increase, though because of past lags in exploration, it
will take some time.

27

See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Mexico: Evictions of indigenous communities fuel
displacement in Chiapas, January 22, 2008, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4796f48b2.html, accessed September 21, 2009.
28
See Associated Press, “School’s out in Oaxaca: Teacher strike,” September 2, 2009, in Taiwan Times Online,
http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/print.php, accessed September 20, 2009.
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Scenario 6: Reformists overthrown by riots
If the reformists promote energy policies that marginalize the poor and indigenous either in terms
of their input on policy or in the provision of private goods, these groups will have become
effectively excluded from the political system. When the poor take to the streets, they are
demonstrating their continued political relevance, despite their diminished voice in the political
system. Fortunately, none of the oil exporters in the region appear headed in this direction, but an
example of this failure can be found in the government of Sánchez de Lozada in gas-exporting
Bolivia between 2002 and 2003.
An overthrow of a moderate by the poor and indigenous demonstrating violently will favor
statists and their RN and ES visions. When such an overthrow occurs, two potential scenarios
can develop. Statists may come to power and develop Scenarios 1 or 2, depending upon whether
Congress was closed or became uncompetitive (Scenario 1) or remained open and competitive
(Scenario 2). If the reformist that was overthrown was replaced with another reformist through
the use of force to suppress the demonstrations, we would likely see Scenario 3b play out.
Promoting Pragmatic and Cooperative Energy Policies
The logic of the market pushes and pulls in different directions at different points in time. The
increased competitiveness of the oil market in the 1960s and the evolution of financial markets in
the 1970s provided countries with new opportunities to reclaim oil rents from IOCs. Yet even as
producing nations were appropriating more rents, IOCs found it still in their interests to work
with producer governments, as Cowhey29 noted almost 30 years ago. But with the inclusiveness
of Latin American political systems significantly increased today, the public-private partnership
must go beyond the producing government-IOC relationship if we are to have stable energy
policies and meet the needs of citizens in exporting and importing countries.
Ultimately, of course, the design of an energy policy is an issue for a country to decide.
Fortunately, contemporary Latin American politics are not characterized by civil wars and
democracy is valued even by the supporters of the leading statists (Chávez and Morales).
29

Peter Cowhey, The Problems of Plenty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
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Domestic politics, however, matter in ways that go beyond whether the country is democratic or
the president prefers a statist or market-oriented path. This study has demonstrated that a country
with an inclusive political system, competitive politics, and leaders who are innovators but
cautious is most likely to adopt energy policies that enable oil and gas to be used effectively to
benefit citizens at home and abroad.
From a normative perspective, this finding is good news, but it does raise important challenges.
Political systems have become more inclusive across the region. While the competitiveness of
politics is under threat in a number of countries, the cause is more related to the current
popularity of certain leaders and the interpretation of particular laws than to a part of a process to
create a dictatorship; consequently, the possibility of increasing political competition remains. In
addition, many leaders in the region are innovative and able to manage risk at appropriate times.
Even in the countries currently led by extremely risk-acceptant leaders (especially Venezuela and
Bolivia), the potential for cautious leaders to rise still remains; the domestic political context for
the success of moderately risk-acceptant leaders, even if they are statists in electoral politics,
needs to be nurtured. If those who oppose the statists are to increase their chances of winning
future elections, politicians need to offer an inclusive vision to the poor and indigenous; too
often, the opposition merely harkens back to the “good old days,” which were not, in fact, good
for this newly mobilized constituency.
IOCs, international financial institutions (IFIs), and the U.S. government can contribute
positively to the development of a competitive political context in which innovative, yet
cautious, leaders are respected and sought after, thus making it more likely that energy policy
will swing back toward cooperative and pragmatic energy relations. So how can the likelihood of
our three key variables lining up this way be positively influenced by foreign actors? It is
fundamental to begin this section with a warning about how not to attempt to wield influence.
Becoming a player or taking sides among players in the political system would be considered
illegitimate behavior and would undermine the very outcomes one is trying to promote. It is,
instead, through apolitical behavior that foreigners can best influence politics.
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It is important for all actors, whether market reformers or statists, to recognize that democracy
and empowerment of the poor and indigenous in Latin America are here for the foreseeable
future and are not phases in the region’s history. In this context, the private sector, whether
domestic or foreign, should recognize that its accountability is no longer vis-à-vis just the leader,
but also to his constituency, particularly the poor and indigenous. Regarding the U.S.
government and IOCs, it is important to move beyond a focus on the leader’s characteristics and
consider the concrete issues and demands of the new inclusiveness that have given voice and
power to the poor and indigenous for the first time. Yet, it doesn’t resolve the practical challenge
of creating competitive political forces and stable government institutions to create an
environment for the political give-and-take that is the very essence of democracy.
The range for constructive, profitable, and cooperative public-private relations in the oil and gas
industry is likely to lie somewhere between the contemporary Colombian and Brazilian
experiences. At one end, we find a government-regulated sector in which private investors
compete on a level playing field with a reasonably efficient NOC (Colombia). At the outer range
toward state control is a sector with the most promising areas limited to private associations with
a reasonably efficient NOC, and all other areas falling under a more openly competitive structure
(Brazil). Chile and Argentina fall within this range, especially with the reforms weakening ES in
the latter.
Relationships that fall outside this range are not likely to be fruitful or sustainable. A major
reform of Mexico’s energy policy would likely fall short of Brazil’s reforms by requiring
significant majority control for Pemex in any venture permitting foreign or private investment.
As a consequence, the reforms will not likely generate the levels of investment required for the
country to meet external and internal demand. The combination of Venezuela’s reserves and its
domestic politics makes it unique, but even so, the private sector is not welcome enough to
generate sufficient investment for the country to produce and export at the levels that would meet
both internal and external demand. Bolivia, and even less so Ecuador, does not have the level of
reserves or the internal political dominance (high inclusiveness and low competitiveness) that
underpin Chávez’ energy policy. While Peru is more generous and welcoming to the private
sector than Colombia (so it lies outside the range on this end), its energy policy is likely be
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unsustainable because it is not generating enough environmental protection or return to the
newly empowered poor and indigenous.
IOCs and the U.S. government have learned that RN and ES are policies adopted by all Latin
American countries to some degree. The more statist leaders must be tolerated, at worst, and
worked with, at best. After the failed 2002 coup attempt against Chávez, the administration of
George W. Bush didn’t respond as the United States did after the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs
operation in Cuba and embargo Venezuela, nor did it fund armed rebellion, as with the Contras
in Nicaragua during the 1980s. Instead, the U.S. government wisely avoided being provoked by
Chávez’ insults or pressured by the vocal, and at times quite vehement, opposition to Chávez in
Caracas, Miami, and Washington.
We can surmise that IOCs, even ExxonMobil and Conoco, have thought about the explicit and
implicit bargaining context since they did not leave the country at the first demand for contract
renegotiation. For two of the IOCs, that has meant reaching a point where Venezuela no longer
fits within their business plans; for most others it has meant staying, but limiting investments to
the minimum acceptable to the government. Those calculations will clearly be affected by a
country’s resource base and expectations about the future of the energy market; nevertheless,
when that minimum investment decreases, both sides will reevaluate. The same process is at
work in Bolivia.
The pursuit of less RN and ES in Latin America cannot mean, however, simply turning the
country’s resources over to the profit-seeking drives of the private sector. Former Bolivian
president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s innovative capitalization program for YPFB was not
theoretically wrong, and indeed was hailed by the IFIs, U.S. government, and foreign private
investors. However, it was untenable to put the reduced rents into long-run development in a
society where two-thirds of the population lives in poverty. Providing incentives to investors that
would actually reduce the absolute revenue of the government in the medium-term as gas was
discovered and exported, could only have been perceived as business-as-usual by a society that
has given up its natural resources for 500 years and still lives in poverty. We should not have
been surprised when the policy proved to be short-lived.
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Because policy is politics, and because the region has a long history of exclusion, what seem like
extraneous events in the U.S. government and IOCs’ eyes are not for many in Latin America.
Sensibilities to the south of the U.S. border are not as sanguine about changes in U.S. or IOC
behavior as many in the United States assume. The violent invasion of Panama by 22,000 U.S.
Marines to capture Gen. Manuel Noriega was 20 years ago, but remains an active memory in the
region. Trade preferences have been terminated for Venezuela and Bolivia over drug policy
issues just within the past few years, but the United States continues to refuse to cut all aid to the
Honduran government installed after the military exiled the democratically elected president.
The administration of Barack Obama insists that it will use its recently-granted access to seven
military bases in Colombia only to help the Colombian government fight drugs and terrorism.
But the ability to easily use those military assets beyond Colombia’s borders raises fears about
future U.S. behavior. Thus the burden of history, or what is seen as a constant threat of U.S.
exploitation, is likely to underpin all evaluation of U.S. government actions. This same historical
context similarly raises suspicions about IOC intentions.
If the demands for RN and ES are to be effectively managed, the link between the oil and gas
industry and an improvement in people’s lives has to be explicit and direct. The statists are aware
of that link and use it. But reformers in Latin American governments, in the United States, and
within the industry have to be as aware of that link if they are to convince the statists that their
own career interests are better served by using their resources more effectively than by simply
extracting more rents and providing private goods.
IOCs are missing an opportunity to address the concerns of the poor and indigenous in ways that
avoid taking sides in domestic politics, but nonetheless positively communicate their role.
Political credibility can be improved through transparency that stimulates the demand for
improved accountability. For example, if IOCs broadly publish the taxes and royalties that they
pay, it can stimulate public demand for greater accountability for those revenues from the
domestic government. In a climate of broad empowerment, it can only benefit IOCs to contribute
to a move toward greater transparency and credibility, which could lead to improved
accountability by governmental and nongovernmental players.
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Some steps have been taken to improve transparency and accountability. Latin American
congresses have punished corrupt cabinet ministers and NOC leaders in Bolivia and Ecuador,
and even impeached two presidents—Venezuela’s Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1993 and Brazil’s
Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992 (though the Federal Supreme Court threw out the charges later
on a technicality; he had already resigned his office). However, these actions are not typical, and
many Latin American governments are still quite opaque in regard to the internal workings of
government. The judiciary is also often heavily politicized. By illuminating their transactions
with the government, IOCs can contribute to improving the climate of transparency. Public
recognition of the “publish what you pay” (PWYP) protocol will also serve to heighten public
awareness of IOCs’ contribution, thereby serving a strong public relations role for the IOC. It is
important in all such communications to maintain a neutral stance that neither supports nor
attacks the government. The point here is to increase information flow, changing the climate
from one in which nothing is known so the worst is assumed, to one that sets an expectation of
disclosure.
IOCs can also improve relations by accepting the priority that countries place on domestic
markets and by responding to environmental concerns with investment in alternative energy.
IOC public relations should target the poor about the medium term needs for oil and gas, as well
as the benefits of alternative energy. The family that has to wait in line for hours to buy LPG, or
has limited access to electricity, may think less about supply issues than about class and
international conspiracies; so it is important to recognize the fundamental linkage over time
between satisfying the domestic market and being able to continue to produce oil and gas in that
country.
Many of the model corporate behaviors that companies employ in their regional headquarters
will also be effective internationally. For example, companies might engage in domestic
philanthropic work and publicize it in the national media, or adopt and promote best practices on
environmental issues. There will be a growing debate in many countries between local desires to
limit oil and gas development and national demands for the revenue and supplies. Working
effectively with the locals will require that the costs of environmental protection be factored into
investments based on global, not national, standards. National governments are typically weak in
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environmental legislation and knowledge, a situation that today produces substantial local
opposition. By leapfrogging over national legislation and adopting global standards for
environmental mitigation and participating in local social development projects, IOCs can avoid
becoming the fall guy for poor provincial programs and inadequate national standards that are
often the targets of local anger.
Conclusion
History matters. It is impossible to keep promising “we’ll do better next time” when centuries of
natural resource exploitation have failed to provide benefits for the majority of a country’s
citizens. Vested interests in maintaining the status quo and institutional obstacles to change have
protected systems that disadvantage newly empowered members of these societies. This cannot
help but affect the credibility of contemporary players, whether foreign or domestic, or whether
in favor of reform or revolutionary change.
Yet, the past does not always determine the future; the options have not been limited to
continued poverty via exclusion of the poor and indigenous from energy market profits or
continued poverty for the nation through exclusion of international capital. Reserves have to be
monetized, and capital and technology are necessary for accessing the increasingly difficult
geology in which the major oil and gas finds are discovered or through which they must be
transported. Consequently, foreign capital will remain a major player in the international oil and
gas market.
In the 1990s, important reforms were undertaken to consolidate democracy after the collapse of
the elite-dominated democracies. Latin American leaders and their international advisers
understood that increased participation and a sense of empowerment by previously excluded
citizens were fundamental to successful democracies. The challenge was to channel the demands
of these groups into existing political institutions (political parties, established unions, etc.) in
ways that strengthened, not threatened, the political system. Brazil, Chile, and Colombia have
clearly succeeded in this task, and Argentina may be getting back on track after the Kirchners’
loss in the 2009 midterm elections; Mexico and Peru are struggling to make the transition. But
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Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia are increasingly proving incapable of accommodating the
demands of the dispossessed in ways that create the context for expanded political and economic
development. The result is political instability and radicalization of policy, both of which have
proven detrimental to the development of regional energy sectors.
The end of the 1990s was probably the moment in which Latin America had the best opportunity
to move toward an inclusive democratic political system. Many neoliberal economic reforms
were on the verge of generating income that could have been invested in employment and social
welfare. Those empowered by the democratic reforms were ready to take control of their destiny
and demand that government be accountable. One of the ironies of these reforms is that efforts to
create transparency and accountability of government to citizens from the top down created a
context for political instability, as empowerment of the poor proceeded at a pace that outstripped
the reform of the parties and the political systems in many countries.
Fortunately, the political economy of energy policy is a constantly evolving process. If the U.S.
government and the IOCs can work with the Cardosos and Uribes of the future to meet the needs
of Latin American societies, the oil and gas industries can develop to the profit of all.
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